ABSTRACT Nowadays, many Android applications enable data encryption to protect the security of private data, making it difficult for investigators to access the clear data even if they have already obtained the application database. Volatile memory dynamically presents the current state of applications and OS, which contains a store of valuable information including the plain text of application data, and it is a significant analysis object in the field of digital forensics. Over the past decade, some forensics researchers have proposed a number of volatile memory acquisition methods for Android mobile devices and have made valuable contributions. However, most of the existing methods are subjecting to severe restrictions in real investigation environment and only can be applied to pre-prepared devices, resulting in these methods are impractical. In order to address this problem, this paper proposes an Android application memory data acquisition method, called PASM, which can be applied to unprepared Android devices. PASM makes use of system-level data migration function provided by Android manufacturers to migrate and load the application private data into an intermediate device. The intermediate device is pre-flashed with a custom kernel providing the function of volatile memory forensics, so that the application private data can be acquired from the volatile memory of the intermediate device. We select thirty privacy-sensitive applications as the test objects and build seven different experiment scenarios to acquire the private data stored in memory image dumped by PASM. The experiment results show that PASM is able to acquire part of private data stored in volatile memory, and more importantly, PASM has the ability to overcome most of the limitations in the real world, which is more practical than existing Android memory acquisition methods.
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital forensics comprises a set of technologies to extract, recover, preserve and examine digital evidence stored in digital devices and has applications in a number of important areas, including investigation of child exploitation, criminal conviction, counter-terrorism, intellectual property disputes, malware detection and more. Mobile forensics has always been an important part of digital forensics. As Android has long dominated the mobile operating system market, the research on Android forensics technology has been the focus of mobile forensics.
Traditional mobile forensics methods are primarily focused on private data stored in non-volatile memory such as
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Shaojun Wang. application databases, pictures, videos and so on. However, non-volatile memory forensics is a kind of ''dead'' analysis, which may be hindered by encryption technologies. Some plain-text information most wanted by forensic investigators, such as account information, user password, only can be found in the volatile memory. In recent years, volatile memory forensics has become a research focus in the field of mobile forensics. In this paper, memory refers to volatile memory unless otherwise specified.
A. MOTIVATION
Over past decade, some forensics researchers have proposed a number of memory acquisition methods for Android mobile devices and have made valuable contributions. However, as detail described in the study of Wächter and Gruhn [1] , existing memory acquisition methods for Android mobile devices are subjecting to severe restrictions in investigation environment. Their study shows clearly that although these methods presented in current research are all feasible, transferring them to unprepared devices as encountered daily by forensic investigators in the real world is rarely possible. Therefore, a real-world practical method of mobile memory data acquisition becomes an urgent requirement. In the survey work of Case [2] , Case and Richard points out that due to the difficulty in acquiring the full physical memory of Android mobile devices in the real-world conditions, the requirement on full physical memory dumps may need to be reevaluated. As discussed in Ali-Gombe's work [3] , there is great value in process memory of applications which contain a great quantity of data accessible, such data will include passwords, emails, browsing history, chat messages, call logs, and more.
From the above considerations, the essential motivation of this paper is to propose a practical memory data acquisition method for Android mobile devices.
B. CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, we make the following contributions:
(1) We have analyzed and concluded the advantages and disadvantages of existing memory acquisition methods, and find that practicability is the biggest issue of memory acquisition methods currently.
(2) We have found that many applications still retain the account login status even after system-level data migration and some private data of these applications, such as the account usernames and other privacy-sensitive data, even the passwords, can be reproduced in an other device memory through system-level data migration function.
(3) Based on this feature, we have proposed an Android application Private data Acquisition method, called PASM, which takes advantage of System-level data migration function provided by Android manufacturers and an intermediate device with a custom kernel providing the function of Memory forensics.
(4) We have discussed the limitations of PASM and concluded that PASM is more practical compared to other existing Android memory acquisition methods.
C. OUTLINE
The rest part of this paper is structured as follows: Section II shows the related works; Section III analyzes the principle of PASM and introduces the framework, implement and procedures of PASM; Section IV presents the experiment setup, scenarios and results; Section V discusses the practicability of PASM and compares it with other existing memory acquisition methods; Section VI concludes the full paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
Since Android inherits the Linux kernel, some memory acquisition methods for Linux can also be applied to the memory acquisition for Android mobile devices. At the same time, due to the specificity of Android devices and systems, there are some Android specific memory acquisition methods.
A. ANDROID MEMORYACQUISITION METHODS INHERIT FROM LINUX
Traditional, Linux memory can be acquired from the memory device file /dev/mem. Unfortunately, Android devices has blocked the access function of /dev/mem so that this method does not work on these devices. Kollár [4] has developed Fmem by leveraging a LKM (Loadable Kernel Module) to create a /dev/fmem device supporting memory acquisition. However, Fmem requires a root privilege and the permission to insert a kernel module, and always need to reboot or reset the devices which is an illegal operation for mobile forensics.
The most widely used memory acquisition tool for Linux/Android is LiME [5] which acquires device memory directly from the kernel through a LKM that parses the memory mapping structures in the kernel and supports dumping physical memory image by SDcard or TCP. As shown by Sylve's work [5] , due to bypass the need for thousands of context switches, LiME acquires a substantially larger percentage of the original data versus methods that acquire through kernel-to-userland facilities. However, due to the using of LKM, LiME still has the same disadvantages as Fmem. In addition to that, LiME requires its kernel module to be built for every version of the Linux kernel.
In order to avoid the need for the kernel module to built for every version of the kernel, Stüttgen and Cohen [6] presents a robust method to build a kernel module for every version of Linux kernel. They discuss how to bypass the version check verifications when a LKM is loaded into the running kernel. However, in order to keep the system stable, the injected acquisition algorithm is extremely simple. As this method still need a root privilege to load a LKM into the kernel, it doesn't completely solve the practicability problems of Android memory acquisition.
B. ANDROID SPECIFIC MEMORY ACQUISITION METHODS
In order to overcome the dependence of the memory acquisition methods on LKM, Yang et al. [7] has proposed the AMExtractor tool for acquiring Android device memory. AMExtractor takes advantage of /dev/kmem and /dev/ptmx to execute code in kernel mode which is supported by most Android devices, so that AMExtractor does not need a LKM to execute code in the kernel. However, AMExtractor also requires a root privilege access to the device and the obtaining of root privilege usually need to reboot or reset the device, which causes the loss of memory evidence. So AMExtractor is also hardly used in forensic investigations.
Similarly, Taubmann et al. [8] has proposed a novel memory acquisition framework based on cold boot with a minimal BMA (Bare Metal Application) on a mobile device. BMA leverages recovery mode to upload the acquisition code to the kernel area of Android recovery image. BMA requires neither a LKM nor a root privilege escalation, but a custom recovery image file for the OS version of the device and a process for flashing. Since BMA needs a reboot process to switch the device from normal mode to recovery mode during the flashing process, it can result in significant loss of evidence. In addition to that, with the deployment of security technologies such as Secure Boot [9] and KNOX [10] , it is difficult to flash a custom recovery image into the device by recovery mode without unlocking the bootloader lock.
Sun et al. [11] has developed a TrustZone-based memory acquisition method called TrustDumper, which is capable of reliably obtaining the RAM memory and CPU registers of the mobile OS even if the OS has crashed or has been compromised. However, TrustDumper is only supported on Freescale i.MX53 QSB, an embedded development board, making it an impractical tool for evidence acquisition from Android devices.
Yang et al. [12] has analyzed the firmware update protocol of Android devices by reverse engineering the bootloader. Based on the analysis result, the author has devised a method that allows access to memory data through the firmware update protocols while the device is running normally, called AMD. AMD has advantages that it can acquire memory data without a device reboot, root privilege escalation, LKM, custom kernel and screen lock bypass. However, AMD still has its own disadvantages. Due to different specifications of each device, AMD requires indepth knowledge of the firmware update protocols and reversing tools on the different devices. However, Android manufacturers usually do not provide these resources, resulting in the lack of practicability of AMD. As new devices are released, firmware update protocols have been changed to various types and there are forensic issues in using AMD for acquiring data.
Based on Yang's work [12] , Park et al. [13] has presented a new methodology to analyze firmware update protocols using fuzz testing for LG devices. This method not only inherits the advantages of AMD, but also can find the communication message and hidden commands without analyzing the internal logic on the devices. However, this method requires a prior knowledge of APIs used in firmware update protocols communication is and cannot analyze the unexecuted logic or code chunk of the protocol. In the worst case, dumb fuzzing cannot investigate all the protocol structures. Therefore, this method is deficient in practicability, too.
III. PRIVATE DATA ACQUISITION METHOD
In this section, we first analysis the principle of our proposed PASM, and then give a detail description of the framework, the implementation and the procedures of PASM.
A. PRINCIPLE OF PASM
As described in Section II, the existing Android memory acquisition methods are sadly lacking in practicability. Directly acquisition of memory data from a unmodified, locked and unrooted Android device, is very difficult due to severe restrictions in real world. However, we lucky find that, to facilitate user operation and enhance the user experience, many Android applications are able to keep the login state even if the device after rebooted. In addition to that, these applications store encrypted private data in different types of files, and dynamically decrypt these private data and load them into memory in clear text when they start.
System-level data migration of Android mobile devices refers to the backup, transmission and restore of Android application files, that both user privilege and system privilege can access, from a mobile device to another mobile device. In recent years, to gain economic benefits, many Android device manufacturers have provided system-level data migration services to facilitate the replacement of new devices for users, such as Samsung Smart Switch [14] , Huawei Phone Clone [15] , XiaoMi Mi Mover [16] , OPPO Clonephone [17] and Vivo Transmit [18] .
In our previous work [19] , we have given an detail analysis of system-level data migration function provided by Android mobile device manufacturers, and find that all the files of third-party applications can be copied to the migrated device and have verified the integrity of APK binary files and databases.
Based on these findings, we infer that, the dynamic running states of Android applications (including the login states, the process states, the network states, and the private data loading states), could be reproduced through system-level data migration function on a other device. Therefore, we propose a Private data Acquisition method based on Systemlevel data migration and Memory forensics for Android applications, called PASM. 
B. FRAMEWORK OF PASM
As shown in FIGURE 1, the framework of PASM consists three parts: the target device, the intermediate device and the forensics platform.
The target device is the target of memory acquisition. In this paper, we consider a normal-used without any modification Android mobile device as the target device. The target device should meet the following conditions:
(1) Supports the system-level data migration function; (1) In order to ensure the consistency of system-level migration tools, the brand of the intermediate device should be same as the target device. In general, the manufacturer should be same, but the model and the system version can be different.
(2) Supports the system-level data migration function; (3) The remaining available non-volatile memory space of the intermediate device must larger than the migration data quantity of the target device.
The forensics platform is the platform for storing the dumped memory image and making further analysis of the memory image. In this paper, we consider an personal computer installing with the memory analysis tools and the hex file analysis tools as the forensics platform.
C. IMPLEMENTATION OF PASM
According to the framework of PASM, the implementation work also can be divided in to three parts. The implementation work on the target device and the forensics platform is easy. For the target device, there is no work need to be done. For the forensics platform, we need to install ADB (Android Debug Bridge) protocol [20] , the memory analysis tool and the hex file analysis tool, Winhex [21] .
The implementation work of PASM mainly focuses on the intermediate device. Because the implementation process of the intermediate device occurs before the data migration process, the memory data is stored in the target device by the time, we do not worry about the loss of evidence caused by various operations on the intermediate device (Some Android manufacturers require to remove all the data in the device when unlocking the device lock). As the open source principle of Android, some manufacturers have opened the official kernel source code and configurations of their models [22] - [24] . In addition, the official system ROM package, the firmware flashing tool, and other system tools also can be found on official or third-party websites. With these advantages, we can fully capable of building an intermediate device with root privilege access and memory export capabilities.
As an example, the build steps of making an official Samsung Galaxy S7 (SM-G9300) to a intermediate device are as follows:
(1) Unlock the device lock. In order to flash the custom kernel into the intermediate device, we must unlock the device lock at first. We can do this using the CROM Service [25] tool downloaded from the Samsung app store.
(2) Extract the boot.img used by Android system. Since the kernel image is integrated into the boot.img file loaded when the Android system starts, we must extract the boot.img used by running system. However, directly extract the boot.img from the running system without a root privilege is infeasible, so we can download an official ROM package and use the Odin [26] tool to flash it into the intermediate device, and extract the boot.img from it.
(3) Customize the kernel. In order to make LiME, the memory acquisition tool used by PASM, work successfully on the intermediate device, we need to recompile the kernel with modifications that enable LKM support and disable the TIMA (Trustzone-based Integrate Measure Architecture) support. The custom kernel is then compiled using Android-NDK [27] , the cross-compilation tool. With the help of Android image tool [28] , unpack the boot.img file, replace the boot.img-zImage file with the custom kernel Image generated by compilation, and then repack to generate a new boot.img file. Finally, use Odin to flash the new boot.img into the intermediate device to complete the customize work of kernel.
(4) Obtain the root privilege. After the kernel enable LKM function, we also need a root privilege to load the kernel module compiled by LiME. We use TWRP [29] (Team Win Recovery Project), the famous third-party recovery flashing tool, to install SuperSU [30] , the famous root permission tool on the intermediate device.
(5) Compile and import LiME. Use the same crosscompilation tool as when the kernel was compiled to compile the source code of LiME, and import the generated kernel module into the sdcard partition of the intermediate device.
D. PROCEDURES OF PASM
Based on above work, the procedures of PASM are as follows:
( (6) Memory analysis. Using the memory analysis tools to parse the physical memory image acquired from the intermediate device.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we conduct some experiments to evaluate the effectiveness of PASM. We select thirty privacy-sensitive applications as the test set and try to acquire their private data stored in memory images dumped under seven different experiment scenarios, including account username, password and other private data. 
A. EXPERIMENT SETUP
In the experiments, we use a Samsung Galaxy S8 (G9500) mobile as the target device, a Samsung Galaxy S7 (G9300) mobile as the intermediate device, and a Lenovo Desktop (A6810f) as the experimental forensic platform. Detailed information of the hardware and software information of the experimental devices is shown in TABLE 1.
We select a series of most popular applications as the test set, and we do not show the specific information about these applications for security reasons. Based in the provided functionality, these applications are divided into six categories: mobile banking, mobile payment, online shopping, instant messaging, email and games.
The mobile banking (MB) category includes five applications of five major banks in China (i.e., MB1, MB2, MB3, MB4 and MB5). The mobile payment (MP) category comprises five application of four well-known E-wallet systems in China (i.e., MP1, MP2, MP3, MP4 and MP5). The online shopping (OS) category consists of five applications of three famous e-shopping platforms in China (i.e., OS1, OS2, OS3 OS4 and OS5). The instant messaging (IM) category contains five widely-used chatting applications in China (i.e. IM1, IM2, IM3, IM4 and IM5). The email category covers five email applications of five representative information technology companies (i.e. EM1, EM2, EM3, EM4 and EM5). The game category is made up of five most popular games applications in China (i.e. GM1, GM2, GM3, GM4 and GM5).
All of these applications employ usernames and passwords to authenticate the mobile users, enabling remote access to the provided services. They store the users' private data in local databases or remote servers, and often load it into memory when application running.
B. EXPERIMENT SCENARIOS
We set up seven different experiment scenarios to evaluate the effectiveness of PASM. As shown in TABLE 2, the experiment scenarios are briefly described as follows:
Scenario S1: First login and use the test applications on the target device. Then migrate the test applications from the target device to the intermediate device. Finally, dump the memory image from the intermediate device. Scenario S7: Login and use the test applications on the target device. Second switch off the target device. After 10 minutes, switch on the target device. Then migrate the test applications from the target device to the intermediate device. Finally, dump the memory image from the intermediate device.
C. EXPERIMENT RESULTS
In each scenario, we have used our created test account for login to examine the entire set of test applications. For all scenarios, the migrating process last 42 min and the dumping process last 8 min, while the size of the data migration is 15.47 GB and the size of the memory dump is 4 GB. TABLE 3 presents all the findings and the results of the test set for each experiment scenarios. In this table, the symbols U, P and D respectively indicate the successful find of the username, password and other private data (such as account balance of mobile banking, bill records of mobile payment, orders of online shopping, messages of instant messaging, information of email, virtual currency of games and so on), for the specific application and the considered scenario, while the symbol X indicates the search for this content failed.
The experiment results show that:
(1) The vast majority (26/30) of the test applications are able to remain login state of user account after system-level data migration. As a result, our proposed PASM is able to extract account usernames and some private data for most of these applications, as well as passwords (or the key generated by encrypting the password) for a small number of them.
(2) In the experiment scenarios we set up, only the logging out of application account on the target device affects the success rate of PASM. On the contrary, other operations on the target device (such as setting the applications into the background, using the task manager to release the processes of the applications, switching the device to airplane mode, reboot and switching off the device) will not affect the effective of PASM. In other words, our proposed PASM is effective (with the data acquisition success rate up to 65.6%) in most scenarios, cause few users will log out the application account when using their mobiles normally.
(3) Although PASM does not get passwords for most test applications, it can get other private data for part of them, such as the account balance of mobile banking applications, transaction records of mobile payment application and so on.
(4) Judging from the data acquisition success rate of PASM, the data acquisition capability of PASM for game applications (81.9%) is higher than other categories, while for mobile banking applications (31.4%) is the lowest.
V. DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION
In this section, we discuss and analysis the most significant limitations for Android memory acquisition in real world and existing solutions for some of them. Then we evaluates the practicality of PASM and other existing methods according to whether they can bypass these limitations.
A. ISSUE ON SCREEN LOCK
Identifying the exact model of the target device is the first step of forensics procedures for any investigators. In addition to distinguishing by the hardware appearance of the target device, some specific information such as the baseband number, the OS version, the kernel version and so on, only can be identified through manual or ADB protocols access after bypassing the device screen lock. Besides, USB debugging mode is required in most acquisition scenarios, and bypassing the screen lock is the only way to enable it without deleting the volatile memory contents. Unfortunately, the PASM we proposed does not have the ability to bypass the screen lock, so it needs the assistance of other bypass methods.
The bypassing methods of the screen lock can be divided in to two main categories, software-based and physicalbased. One possible software-based method to bypass the screen lock would be using the ADM (Android Device Manager) [31] . However, it is required for this way to work that the forensic investigators could access to the suspects Google account instead and ADM must be enabled on the device. Another possible software-based method would be an exploitation of vulnerability, such as a emergency call glitch discovered by Terrence Eden [32] on the screenlocked Samsung Galaxy Note 2. The physical-based method to bypass the screen lock is performing smudge attacks on the touch screen of the target device. Aviv et al. [33] has provided a preliminary analysis of applying the information learned in a smudge attack to guessing an Android password pattern. Another experiment has shown that fake fingerprints made of conductive silica gel can be used to crack the widely used capacitive sensor fingerprint identification mobile devices [34] . In the GeekPwn 2018 International safety geek contest, a challenger has succeed to leveraging a plain white plastic card and the fingerprint vestiges left on the screen to crack the screen fingerprint recognition system of a mobile phone [35] .
B. ISSUE ON ROOT PRIVILEGE
Although current universal memory acquisition methods for Android device, such as AMExtractor [7] , no longer rely on injecting a LKM or reflashing a custom kernel image to read memory, as LiME [5] did, a root privilege is still required to access the entire memory of Android devices.
The most common method to gain a root privilege access on an Android device is unlocking Bootloader and flashing the device with a custom kernel image which allows for gaining a root privilege. However, the process of unlock Bootloader requires the device be reset to factory defaults, which deletes all persistent user data on the device. In addition to that, the device need to reboot to switch to fastboot mode, leaving no memory evidences at all on the device. Another method is exploiting the vulnerability to gain a root privilege. This method may not require a reboot, hence can save the memory content. However, with the constant update of the Android system and the deployment of security technologies, a vulnerability that provides a root privilege access without rebooting the device is very rare.
Therefore, memory acquisition methods that rely on root privilege are impractical on unmodified Android mobile devices in real world conditions. Fortunately, in our proposed PASM, we do not need the root privilege of the target device but that of the intermediate device.
Because the obtain process of root privilege on intermediate device occurs before the data migration, there is no loss of evidence during this process.
C. ISSUE ON KERNEL SOURCE AVAILABILITY
Most existing Android memory acquisition methods need detail information about the system and kernel of the target device, such as the system version, the baseband version and the kernel version. Especially, the methods that extract the memory directly from the kernel through LKM, need the kernel compiler version and the kernel compilation configuration options to compile a functional kernel module to complete this work. Although some Android manufacturers have opened some resources, such as the official system ROM image, the official kernel source code and compile configuration of their models, it is still difficult to ensure the exact version of the kernel compiler and there is no guarantee that the actual kernel is compiled the official way. Besides, the acquisition methods based on firmware update protocol [12] , [13] also requires the exact bootloader resources of the target device.
In our proposed PASM, the customization process of intermediate equipment is completely controllable. Taking advantage of the open kernel resources, we can custom kernel and system configuration of the intermediate device to satisfy our needs. 
D. PRACTICABILITY EVALUATION
We evaluate the practicability of the PASM by comparing it with other memory data acquisition methods to see if the above limitations can be bypassed. The comparison result is shown in the Table 4 .
As shown in TABLE 4, the first six memory acquisition methods (Fmem, LiME, Stüttgen, AMExtractor, BMA and TrustDumper) require obtaining a root privilege or flashing VOLUME 7, 2019 a custom recovery image. Therefore, these methods often need to reboot or even reset the target device during the data extraction process, which may lead to the loss of memory evidence and makes these methods impractical.
The methods based on firmware update protocol (AMD [12] and the method proposed by Park [13] ) and our proposed PASM require neither reboot nor reset on the target device, which are more practical in the real world forensics environment. In addition to that, the methods based on firmware update protocol cost a lot of time and effort to reverse and test the firmware update protocol of the target device, and only can be applied to the model that the protocol can successfully reverse. By contrast, our proposed PASM can be applied to all the brands which support system-level data migration. However, PASM has the disadvantage that it need to bypass the screen lock, which needs the assistance of screen lock bypass methods.
VI. CONCLUSION
Application memory data is store in plain-text, so that data acquisition methods based on memory forensics can bypass various data encryption technologies. However, due to the limitations of real world conditions, most of the existing memory acquisition methods of Android mobile devices are impractical for an unmodified Android device. To solve this problem, this paper proposes a private data Acquisition method based on system-level data migration and memory forensics for Android mobile devices, called PASM. This paper introduces the principle, framework, implementation and procedure of PASM in detail. Thirty applications of six categories are test in seven different experimental scenarios. The experiment results show that our proposed PASM can effectively obtain the memory data (including account username, password and other private data) of some applications installed on unmodified Android devices. Consider on severe restrictions in real world investigation environment, PASM has a better practicality than the existing memory data acquisition methods for Android devices. 
